Defence changes in the next decade

BY REGINALD RENAGI

A BETTER BALANCED approach to decision-making within the Papua New Guinea defence organisation requires processes to encourage consultation and reconcile diverse views in a timely manner leading to clearer decisions and better accountability.

Defence has had too many committees with the same senior-ranked members.

Over the past two years, these committees have been reduced to less than six.

But they still need to improve their assertiveness to manage many outstanding issues built up over previous years.

The future PNGDF must give high priority to sovereign defence tasks.

More of the Ministry’s attention and resources will need to focus on urgent internal security challenges and national development initiatives like civic action tasks.

To perform its future roles effectively, defence operations will have to be more responsive.

This means developing highly-mobile special operations forces that can react more quickly to internal security contingencies.

More attention must focus on readiness and sustainability than on buying expensive equipment.

The future PNGDF must be a better organised and well-equipped force.

It should be innovative and flexible and share support functions with the civil police force.

The Defence secretary and Force commander must be responsible for implementation of a force restructure and the subsequent reorganisation described in Part I of this series (see post below).

A small force restructure implementation team should be established this year.

Ongoing evaluation must be done to monitor achievement of resource efficiencies.

The management of change will be undertaken by line managers so that process and outcomes are owned by the personnel and organisations involved in the activity.

Responsibility for creating new sub-organisations should belong to the programme manager who will be responsible for the arrangements proposed by the review.

The PNGDF is currently not structured to adequately fulfill its present roles, particularly in internal security, while at the same time engaged in nation building tasks.

A previous Cabinet decision to raise the manpower ceiling to 5,200 by 1995 did not materialise, demonstrating the then government’s lack of political will.

The present security situation demands that the government must rescind the decision in late 2001 to cut the PNGDF’s strength by over 60%.

 It must commit to boosting the military’s size to over 10,000 and to increase the size of the police force.

The restructuring must be conducted in phases to permit the initial reorganisation to take place at minimum cost.

The government needs to make a continuous and stable investment for a decade to properly reshape the department and the PNGDF.

There is no other option but to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of defence within the next decade.

The writer is confident that an appropriate level of defence funding for national security can be achieved.

Defence needs appropriate financial resources to execute a restructuring plan.

A defence re-organisation is required in Papua New Guinea

BY REGINALD RENAGI

OVER THE NEXT few years to the end of the decade, Papua New Guinea’s defence organisation needs to undergo some far-reaching changes.

As part of the government’s long-term Defence Reform Plan, the Ministry of Defence must continually improve its functions by systematically implementing rationalisation at the higher defence level.

In recent times, a separate training branch has been established within the Murray Barracks defence headquarters in Port Moresby.

The Ministry will need to co-locate public affairs, legal services and an integrated logistics component.

An urgent need also exists for a defence reserve force structure to include lower level operations headquarters under existing command arrangements.

The strategic and operational headquarters must also be refined and reshaped.

Unlike in previous years, the new Defence Force headquarters must work well with the Defence Department.

After this, operational units must be further reviewed in some depth to streamline their structures and operational roles.

These proposals will involve changes to the PNGDF’s current organisation, preferably over the next 12 months to two years to make it more effective and efficient.

Once provisional arrangements have been trialled and established, the Ministry should start boosting the overall strength of the Force to meet PNG’s future security requirements.

In addition, the Ministry must be more creative in the use of civil contractors to efficiently maintain its capital assets such as ships, aircraft, heavy vehicles and associated equipment.

In the next two years, before the next national general elections, the PNG government through the Ministry must fully commit to initiate changes designed to deliver defence cost savings while substantially increasing the country’s total military effectiveness.

The Ministry’s continuing challenge is to keep the Defence organisation focused on key outcomes in ways that conform to broader government practices and requirements.

There also needs to be greater centralisation of policy and planning functions, including capability development arrangements.

The Defence secretary and the Force commander must be unambiguously in charge of the Defence organisation.

There needs to be a clear definition of functions solely the responsibility of the secretary, solely those of the Commander, and those which are shared.

A Chiefs of Staff Committee and a senior Defence Management Committee should also be created to provide high level policy and management guidance to the organisation.

The ways in which the military branch and civilian division heads exercise their responsibilities must be considerably changed.

In short, defence executives from both civil and military must know where their organisation wants to go, and what resources it has to get there.